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satisfactory and equitable to all the parties-restitution to Viacom
at a fair price for any services performed and non-enforcement of
any executory portions of the contract."0
Restitution would not give rise to unjust enrichment, nor complicate the action, yet it would restore Viacom to its original position, suffering no more than a loss of anticipated profits. Such a
resolution may serve to negate the anticompetitive abuses incurred
by Tandem and simultaneously maintain the integrity of the antitrust laws.
MARC

L.

FAUST

Sentencing Upon Revocation of Probation in
Florida
The Supreme Court of Florida held that a trial court is free
to impose any sentence upon revocation of probation which it
might have originally imposed despite the fact that the trial court
had originally imposed a lesser sentence. In so doing, the court
overruled the overwhelming weight of authority exhibited by the
lower appellate courts. The author suggests that the defendant's
constitutionalprotection against being twice placed in jeopardy
for the same offense and his right to counsel may have been
infringed upon in the process.
The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of heroin, issuing a
worthless check, and issuing a forged instrument. The trial judge
found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 1 year in the county jail for each offense, to be followed
by 5 years probation. All sentences were to be served concurrently.
Thereafter, the trial court amended each of the sentences by reducing the period to be spent in the county jail to the 85 days then
served, and by suspending the execution of the remainder of the jail
sentences; but the court retained the 5 year probationary period.
The defendant subsequently violated his probation by committing
60. See Comment, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. CI. L.
REv. 758, 776 (1960).
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other felonies.' Following a probation revocation hearing, the trial
judge revoked the defendant's probation, disregarded the previous
sentences, and imposed three concurrent sentences each consisting
of 2 years imprisonment in the state penitentiary with credit given
for 135 days previously served in the county jail.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the judgment but set aside the new sentences,' holding that where a defendant has been placed on probation after completing a specified
period of imprisonment pursuant to Florida Statutes section
948.01(4)(1973), 3 revocation of probation operates to subject the de1. The defendant committed aggravated assault. In addition, at the time of his arrest,
he had in his possession a pistol and cocaine. Jones v. State, 296 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1974).
2. Jones v. State, 296 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
3. For the purpose of aiding readers in understanding this case note and the cases cited
herein, the relevant portions of Florida's probation statutes as they existed in 1973 are presented:
FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (1973) When courts may place defendant on probation(3) If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant
is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of
justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently
suffer the penalty imposed by law, the court, in its discretion, may either adjudge
the defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt and in
either case stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant,
and shall place him upon probation under the supervision and control of the
commission for the duration of such probation. And the said commission shall
thereupon and thereafter, during the continuance of such probation, have the
supervision and control of the defendant.
(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed,
the court, in its discretion, may at the time of sentencing direct the defendant to
be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence.
In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder
of sentence imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed
upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.
FLA. STAT. § 948.06 (1973) Violation of probation; revocation; modification; continuance(1) If such charge is not at said time admitted by the probationer and if it
is not dismissed, the court, as soon as may be practicable, shall give the probationer an opportunity to be fully heard on his behalf in person or by counsel. After
such hearing, the court may revoke, modify, or continue the probation. If such
probation is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer guilty of the offense
charged and proven or admitted, unless he shall have previously been adjudged
guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before
placing the probationer on probation.
Effective July 1, 1974, FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) was amended to read: "Whenever punish.
ment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed
.... "Thus, the split sentence alternative is no longer limited to situations where confinement in the county jail is prescribed.

19761

CASES NOTED

1065

fendant to a penalty of serving no more than that portion of the jail
sentence which was stayed and withheld incident to placing him on
probation.'
Due to the great public interest in this problem, the Third
District certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida: Where a convicted defendant is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment with directions that he be placed on probation upon
completion of a specified period of such sentence with the remainder
of the jail sentence stayed and withheld, can the court impose upon
revocation of probation a new and increased sentence of imprisonment which the court could have originally imposed, or is the time
to be served following revocation of probation limited to the unserved portion of the original sentence?
After granting the state's petition for writ of certiorari, the supreme court held, reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the new sentences imposed by the trial court: A defendant
placed on probation pursuant to Florida Statutes section 948.01(4)
(1973), who subsequently violates that probation, may be sentenced to imprisonment by the trial judge for the same period of
years as the court could have originally imposed in accordance with
Florida Statutes section 948.06 (1973), ' without the prerequisite
of establishing a term of sentence and withholding a part of that
Although not essential to the determination of the noted case, the Supreme Court of
Florida interpreted FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (1973) as authorizing a trial judge to prescribe a
period of imprisonment in the county jail followed by probation for those offenses punishable
only by imprisonment in the county jail (misdemeanor offenses). State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d
18, 24. The court held that the 1974 amendment to section 948.01(4) expands the trial judge's
authority to include felonies as well as misdemeanors in the use of the split sentence alternative (a period of incarceration in connection with a period of probation). Id.
Other amendments to Florida's probation statutes since 1973 are not essential to the
analysis of this case.
Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent citations to the probation statutes will refer to
the 1973 version.
4. Initially the Third District found that the original sentences providing for a term of
incarceration to be followed by a period of probation were not authorized by section 948.01(4)
since no portion of the jail sentence was stayed and withheld for use in the event that violation
of probation should occur. The amendment to the sentences, reducing the term of imprisonment to 85 days, however, rendered the sentences appropriate since the effect thereof was to
withhold the execution of the remainder of the one year jail sentence initially imposed in each
case.
The Third District remanded the cause with directions that the defendant be returned
to the county jail for the unserved portion of the original sentences.
5. See note 3 supra.
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term at the initial sentencing proceedings. State v. Jones, 327 So.
2d 18 (Fla. 1976).1
The supreme court's holding and statutory construction are in
direct conflict with a multitude of district court decisions7
originating in the District Court of Appeal, Third District. In
Williams v. State,' the Third District held that in order to impose
a valid term of probation in connection with a period of imprisonment under section 948.01(4), the trial court must withhold execution' of a portion of the sentence imposed upon the defendant. In
Williams, a defendant was placed on probation after completing a
maximum term of imprisonment, with no part of the sentence withheld. The probation portion of the sentence was held to be null and
void.' 0
In Hutchins v. State," the Third District, further interpreted
the probation statutes by holding that where a defendant had been
6. The supreme court also held that trial courts have general authority to require a
specific period of incarceration as a condition of probation for felony and misdemeanor offenses pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 948.03 (1973). 327 So. 2d at 24. It should be noted, however, that
this was not at issue in the instant case and that this holding was merely an interpretation
of the probation statute, no doubt designed to dispose of four companion cases: State v.
Baker, 327 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1976); State v. Lopez, 327 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1976); State v. Cummings,
327 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1976); State v. Green, 327 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1976). Moreover, the holding is
not a novel one. Several district court decisions have so interpreted the statute. See, e.g.,
Hults v. State, 307 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Brown v. State, 302 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1974).
In addition, the court held that, upon revocation of probation, a defendant must be given
credit for any period of time spent in jail pursuant to a split sentence probation order, in
accordance with the principles enunciated in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
whether it had been imposed pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4), or as a condition of probation
under FLA. STAT. § 948.03. 327 So. 2d at 25. In so holding, the court construed FLA. STAT. §
948.06(2), which provides that "[n]o part of the time that the defendant is on probation shall
be considered as any part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve," to apply only to
time spent under probation supervision without incarceration.
7. E.g., Woodruff v. State, 309 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Lennard v. State, 308 So.
2d 579 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); Harrell v. State, 308 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Hults v. State,
307 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975); Scoggins v. State, 299 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); see
Waters v. State, 290 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 295 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1974).
8. 280 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
9. The Third District stated that "the trial court must withhold imposition of a portion
of the sentence imposed upon the defendant." Id. at 519 (emphasis added). It is apparent
from reading Williams and the cases which followed, (see cases cited in note 7 supra) that
the court used the word impositionsynonomously with execution, and that the court intended
to hold that the trial judge must suspend execution of part of an imposed sentence.
10. Although the issue of the legality of the defendant's sentence was not raised as a
point on appeal, the Williams court considered the sentence to be fundamental error and
reviewed the matter sue sponte. The cases cited in note 7 supra, all follow the Williams rule.
11. 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1974).
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placed on probation pursuant to section 948.01(4), revocation of
probation operated to subject the defendant to serving no more than
the remaining portion of the jail sentence which was withheld originally.
Thus, where a court in sentencing a defendant to imprisonment for a designated period in the county jail provides that after
serving a stated portion thereof the defendant should be on probation for some period, the penalty for a violation of probation
would call for return of the defendant to the county jail for the
unserved balance of the jail sentence, or such part thereof as the
court should determine.2
The Third District's interpretation of section 948.01(4)3 which
required the trial judge at the initial sentencing proceeding to impose a total sentence immediately followed by the withholding of a
part thereof for use in the event probation is revoked, was expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court of Florida in the principal case.'"
Thus, the noted decision effectively overruled Williams, Hutchins,
and the plethora of cases which followed. 5
Under the supreme court's interpretation, a trial judge seeking
to employ the split sentence alternative authorized by section
948.01(4) need not prescribe the total sentence and stay and withhold the execution of part of that sentence in order to establish a
period of probation." The trial judge now may sentence the defen12. Id. at 246-47. Several district court decisions have held in accord with this principle.
See, e.g., Durham v. State, 304 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Scoggins v. State, 299 So. 2d
669 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Cleveland v. State, 287 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
13. In the noted decision, the supreme court indicated that the four district courts of
appeal have had varied constructions and interpretations of section 948.01(4) and have attempted to distinguish the Williams decision, 327 So. 2d at 23. Upon careful analysis, however, it is apparent that all four districts have essentially accepted the Third District's
interpretation. See authorities in notes 7 and 11 supra.
Washington v. State, 284 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), was cited by the supreme court
as holding contrary to Williams. The issue of the legality of an increased sentence upon
probation revocation was not raised on appeal and the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, did not choose to address itself to the issue sua sponte. Since the court did not pass
upon the question, the case should not be cited as being inconsistent with Williams.
In Lewis v. State, 298 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), cited by the supreme court in
attempting to distinguish Williams, imposition of sentence following a plea of guilty was
withheld and the defendant was placed on probation pursuant to section 948.01(3). The
Williams-Hutchins interpretation of section 948.01(4), therefore, was totally inapplicable.
14. 327 So. 2d at 25.
15. See cases cited in notes 7 and 12, supra.
16. 327 So. 2d at 20. The court indicated that its interpretation of section 948.01(4) was
consistent with FLA. R. CriM. P. 3.790, which provides that pronouncement and imposition
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dant to a specified term of imprisonment to be followed by a specific
period of probation. If probation is subsequently revoked, the trial
court may impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the defendant on probation, 1 with credit given
for the time spent in jail. 8
Although the supreme court's interpretation seems reasonable
on its face, the court's analysis of the probation statutes and its
criticism of the Third District's construction cannot withstand close
scrutiny. The supreme court criticized the Third District's interpretation of section 948.01(4) as being inconsistent with the procedure
for straight probation authorized by section 948.01(3) and in direct
conflict with the revocation procedure prescribed by section
948.06.11 Under the straight probation alternative of section
948.01(3), imposition of sentence immediately following a finding of
guilt or a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere is withheld and the
defendant is placed on probation. Upon a subsequent revocation of
probation, the trial judge is authorized by section 948.06 to impose
any sentence which he might have imposed originally had he not
chosen to place the defendant on straight probation. Under the split
sentence alternative of section 948.01(4), as interpreted by the Third
District, sentence is imposed at the initial sentencing hearing, but
the execution of part of that sentence may be withheld and the
defendant is placed on probation after serving a specified portion of
the sentence.'" If probation is subsequently revoked, the defendant
would not be sentenced again but would be returned to jail to serve
the remainder of the jail sentence originally imposed, or such lesser
period as the court might determine." Thus, Florida Statutes secof sentence of imprisonment shall not be made upon a defendant who is to be placed on
probation until such time as the probation is revoked. 327 So. 2d at 25, n.3. This rule,
however, contains the procedural aspects of FLA. STAT. §§ 948.01(1),(2),(3), and 948.06, and
does not relate to FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4). See Committee Notes and Author's Comment to
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.790, 34 FLA. STAT. ANN. at 295-98 (1975); Danese, Judgment and Sentence,
in THE FLORIDA BAR (CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)
6.12 (1968).
17. FLA. STAT. § 948.06 (1973).
18. 327 So. 2d at 25. See note 6, supra.
19. 327 So. 2d at 25.
20. See Jones v. State, 296 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Williams v. State, 280 So. 2d
518 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
21. FLA. STAT. § 948.06 authorizes a trial court, upon revocation of probation, to "impose
any sentence which it might have originally imposed," and does not expressly limit punishment to the unserved portion of the original sentence imposed pursuant to section 948.01(4).
In light of the interpretation by the Third District, however, this provision relates only to
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tions 948.01(3)(4), and 948.06, as read by the Third District, give the
trial judge, in his discretion, the option of either imposing a definite
sentence immediately upon a determination of guilt, or withholding
imposition of sentence until such time as the defendant violates
probation. The probation statutes are easily amenable to such an
interpretation and there is no apparent inconsistency or conflict in
the statutory provisions under this construction.2 2
cases where imposition of sentence was withheld and the defendant had been placed on
probation pursuant to section 948.01(3). See Jones v. State, 296 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1973); Hutchins v. State, 826 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
Florida's Probation Act, as originally enacted in 1941, authorized a trial court to place a
defendant on probation only by withholding imposition of sentence, the procedure now authorized by section 948.01(3). Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20519 § 20. The authority of the trial court
to impose any sentence which could have been imposed originally, therefore, clearly related
to revocation of straight probation. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20519 § 26. When the split sentence
alternative of section 948.01(4) was enacted in 1967, no corresponding revision was made in
the revocation procedure of section 948.06. See Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-204. Whether the power
to impose a sentence upon revocation of probation was intended to apply where sentence has
already been imposed under section 948.01(4) is a question of statutory construction, and has
resulted in the conflicting interpretations illustrated in the instant case.
For an analysis of the probation procedure prior to the enactment of section 948.01(4),
see Clark, Probationin the Criminal Courts, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 213 (1961).
22. The practicability of the Third District's construction can be illustrated by an analogy to the federal statutes and case law. In Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943),
the United States Supreme Court was called upon to construe federal probation statutes
which were similar to FLA. STAT. §§ 948.01 (1973) et. seq. The federal statute involved, 18
U.S.C. § 724 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970), permitted a trial court to suspend
the imposition or execution of a sentence and to place the defendant on probation. Upon
revocation of probation, 18 U.S.C. § 725 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1948), authorized the trial court to "impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed."
The Supreme Court construed these statutory provisions as authorizing a trial court to
either impose a definite term of imprisonment in advance of probation or to defer the imposition of sentence until such time as the defendant violates probation. The Court went on to
hold that where a trial judge exercises his discretion by sentencing an offender in advance of
probation, he may not later, upon revocation of probation, set aside that sentence and
increase the term of imprisonment. But see In re White, 18 N.J. 449, 114 A.2d 261 (1955),
where the Supreme Court of New Jersey disagreed with the majority in Roberts and recognized that a state court is not bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
determining the construction and interpretation of a state statute.
In 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 3653 was amended to conform to the Roberts decision:
"Thereupon the court may revoke the probation and require him to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence, and, if imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any
sentence which might originally have been imposed."
It is now well settled in federal courts that where imposition of sentence has been withheld, upon revocation of probation, a trial court may impose any sentence which might have
originally been imposed. On the other hand, where execution of a sentence has been suspended, a trial court is without authority to impose a sentence in excess of that originally
imposed. See, e.g., Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1970) (where imposition
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The source of the divergent interpretation by the Supreme
Court of Florida does not lie in any incongruity in the Third District's construction, but rather in the ambiguous language of section
918.01(4), particularly the words: "the court shall stay and withhold
the imposition of the remainder of the sentence imposed upon the
defendant ..
."23
The supreme court could find no legislative intent in the above
language which would require a trial judge to impose the total sentence upon the defendant, at the initial sentencing proceeding, followed by withholding the execution of a part thereof." Rather, the
court interpreted this provision to mean that the time spent in jail
pursuant to a split sentence "must be within any maximum jail
sentence which could be imposed." 25 It seems inconceivable that the
state legislature would have enacted such a provision merely to
remind trial judges that they may not sentence a defendant beyond
the maximum time authorized by law. Moreover, in construing the
subsection as requiring the trial court to withhold imposition of the
remainder of the sentence which could be imposed, the supreme
court seemed to ignore the express mandate of the statute that the
court shall withhold "the remainder of sentence imposed upon the
defendant.""
Although the supreme court altered the existing case law by
construing section 948.01(4) as authorizing a trial court to place a
defendant on probation without the necessity of imposing a sentence and withholding part of it, clearly the most significant aspect
of the noted decision lies in the holding that upon revocation of
probation, a trial court may impose, pursuant to section 948.06, any
sentence which might have been imposed originally, whether the
of sentence was withheld); Williams v. United States, 310 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1962) (where

execution of sentence was suspended). See generally 2

WRIGHT FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

Criminal §§ 529, 530 (1969).
23. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (1973).
24. 327 So. 2d at 25.
25. Id. (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that under the supreme court's interpretation of section 948.01(4), the words "could be" are impliedly inserted before the phrase
"imposed upon the defendant," while under the Third District's construction, the word
"execution" is substituted for "imposition." Thus, the ambiguity of section 948.01(4) is
evidenced by the inability of either court to construe or apply the exact statutory language.
26. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (1973) (emphasis added). In its opinion, the supreme court
conveniently quoted the phrase, "withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence" out
of context of section 948.01(4), and ignored the language immediately following, "imposed
upon the defendant," without any indication that language was omitted. 327 So. 2d at 25.
PROCEDURE,

19761

CASES NOTED

defendant had been placed on straight probation under section
948.01(3), or pursuant to a split sentence under section 948.01(4)."
Such an interpretation seems to render an original sentence issued
under the authority of section 948.01(4) a meaningless formality,
since upon revocation of probation such sentence can be revoked,
modified or increased. A trial court no longer has the option, as it
did under the Third District's interpretation, of placing a defendant
on probation while prescribing a definite and final sentence which
it believes is justified for the offense committed.
While it may be asserted that the trial judge is the person most
qualified to pronounce sentence for the crime for which a defendant
has been convicted," it is arguable that assessment of punishment
immediately following conviction is based largely upon conjecture.2 9
At that point, a judge can only speculate as to whether a defendant
may be rehabilitated while continuing at large under the supervision of probation officials, or whether it is necessary to remove the
defendant from society by placing him within the confines of a
penitentiary. One function of probation is to supplant such speculative action by judgment based upon experience after observing the
probationer's ability to function in society within appropriate limitsY' Perhaps courts should not countenance the notion that a probationer has a vested interest in the original sentence since this may
encourage him to weigh the length of such sentence against any
advantages he may find in violating his probation. The possibility
of receiving a more stringent sentence upon revocation of probation,
on the other hand, may well serve as a deterrent for probation violations. These policy considerations may have pursuaded the Supreme Court of Florida to extend the authority of a trial judge to
impose upon a previously sentenced probationer a new and increased sentence upon revocation of his probation.3 On the other
hand, Justice Boyd, in his dissenting opinion stated that:
27. 327 So. 2d at 25.
28. See, e.g., Durham v. State, 304 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). See generally N.
WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 117-18 (1971), reviewed, Cross, 1970 CRIm. L. REv.
1.
29. See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 273 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. Id. A trial judge can achieve this object of probation under both the Third District's
and the Supreme Court of Florida's interpretation of the state probation statutes merely by
withholding imposition of sentence at the initial sentencing hearing, and placing the defendant on straight probation pursuant to section 948.01(3).
31. The supreme court did not discuss any policy considerations in the majority opinion,
but confined its decision to statutory interpretation.
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Perhaps true justice could be attained by permitting a court
to call back and resentence an erring probationer released from
county jail during his specified term of incarceration, but I find
no Florida statute which permits such action as is approved by
the majority opinion. The deprivation of personal liberty by
courts for violating criminal statutes must never exceed the punishment authorized by the Legislature. If more harsh sentences
are needed the Legislature, not the courts, should change the

law .32
In developing its questionable construction of Florida's probation statutes, the supreme court failed to consider the constitutional
impact of its decision. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
Mempa v. Rhay,33 held that an indigent probationer is entitled to
be represented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation and
sentencing hearing. 4 The Court held that the right to counsel exists
"at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of
a criminal accused may be affected," 3 5 and that sentencing was one
32. 327 So. 2d at 26. Justice Boyd conceded that Florida Statutes section 948.01(4) (1973)
was ambiguous and in need of legislative clarification, but he emphasized the well recognized
principle of law that ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be resolved in favor of accused
persons, citing Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975), and Snowden v. Brown, 60 Fla.
212, 53 So. 548 (1940).
Justice Boyd was of the opinion that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by
imposing a new and increased sentence from the 1 year sentence previously imposed. The
dissent suggested that if the offenses committed during the probationary period were deserving of additional punishments, the trial court could have punished the defendant for them
upon separate and independent convictions. 328 So. 2d at 26.
33. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
34. Accord, Machwart v. State, 222 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969); Phillips v. State, 165
So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); see Gargan v. State, 217 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969); 44
A.L.R.3d 306 (1972). For an excellent analysis of Mempa, see Cohen, Sentencing, Probation,
and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1968).
In Mempa, imposition of sentence was withheld incident to placing the defendants on
probation, and the defendants received their initial and final sentences at their probation
revocation hearings. In a subsequent case where a definite sentence had already been imposed
at trial and revocation of probation operated only to subject the defendant to serving the
imposed sentence, the Supreme Court held that a probationer does not have an absolute right
to counsel at such a probation revocation hearing but that in some cases due process would
require that counsel be provided. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Thus it is clear
that the factor which compelled the Court to require counsel at the probation revocation
hearing in Mempa, was that sentence was to be imposed at the hearing. Although the procedure used in placing the defendant on probation in the instant case was similar to that used
in Gagnon, the fact that a new and increased sentence was imposed at the defendant's
probation revocation hearing makes the holding and reasoning of Mempa more apposite than
Gagnon.
35. 389 U.S. at 134.
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such stage. In the noted case, it was apparent from the record that
the indigent defendant was not represented by counsel at the hearing in which his probation was revoked and a new sentence was
imposed, and that no waiver of the right to counsel had been executed. 6 Although the point was briefed and argued before the Supreme Court of Florida," the court did not address itself to the issue
when it remanded the cause with directions to reinstate the sentences imposed at the revocation hearing. It is submitted that in
affirming sentences which were imposed upon the defendant without the benefit of appointed counsel, the court condoned the deprivation of the defendant's liberty in violation of his constitutional
rights to counsel39 and to due process of law.4"
Additionally, the supreme court's decision would seem to have
infringed upon the defendant's constitutional protection against
being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense." It is well
settled that the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States"
and Florida 3 Constitutions not only protect an accused from double
prosecutions for the same crime, but also protect against multiple
punishments for the same offense.4 Accordingly, it has been consistently held that a trial court is without authority to set aside a
judgment and sentence once it has been partially satisfied by a
defendant, and impose a new and increased sentence, on the ground
that to increase the penalty is to subject a defendant to double
punishment for the same offense.4" The defendant in the principal
case served part of the sentences initially imposed,46 yet the supreme
36. Record at 26-27.
37. See Brief for Respondent at 7-9; State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976).
38. 327 So. 2d at 25.
39. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
40. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
41. Although the issue of double jeopardy was not briefed or argued on appeal, the court,
in its discretion, may have reviewed such a fundamental issue sua sponte. FLA. App. R. 3.7(i),
6.16(a); see State v. Williams, 198 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1967).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .").
43. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.").
44. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall)
163 (1874); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L. J. 262, 265-66 (1965).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931); Deutschmann v. United States,
254 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1958); Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973); Ex Parte Basso, 41
So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949); Beckom v. State, 227 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
46. 327 So. 2d at 20-21.
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court upheld the imposition of new and increased sentences upon
revocation of his probation,47 in apparent contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to be protected against receiving double punishments for the same crimes."
The prospective application of the supreme court's interpretation of the probation statutes enunciated in the Jones decision,
would seem to permit trial courts, upon probation revocation, to
vacate a partially satisfied sentence imposed pursuant to Florida
Statutes section 948.01(4), and to impose a new and increased sentence upon a probationer in derogation of the well established principle that a trial court is without authority to increase a sentence
once the defendant has begun serving it. It is obvious that the current probation statutes are ambiguous and in need of clarification.
It is submitted, however, that the statutes, as construed by the
Supreme Court of Florida, are unconstitutional as violative of the
double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Florida
Constitutions. It can only be hoped that if the legislature intended
a different interpretation, it will see fit to revise or amend the statutes in a manner consistent with constitutional protections as well
as the policy of probation. If Florida courts continue to impose new
and increased sentences at probation revocation hearings, it is
urged that the courts respect the probationers' constitutional right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing in which sentence is to
be imposed, and provide indigent probationers with court appointed
counsel.
LAWRENCE

A. FARESE

47. 327 So. 2d at 25.
48. The question of a possible double jeopardy violation under similar circumstances was
presented to the United States Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264

(1943), but the case was decided on other grounds. See note 22, supra. The majority in the
circuit court opinion, Roberts v. United States, 131 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1943), rejected the
double jeopardy argument while the dissenting judge would have held that the double jeopardy right had been violated.
It is clear that no double jeopardy violation occurs where a probationer, who has been
placed on straight probation pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 948.01(3) (1973), is sentenced at the'
probation revocation hearing since the defendant receives only one punishment for the crime
for which he was convicted. The order initially placing the defendant on probation is not
considered to be a sentence. See Brown v. State, 302 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).

